The supply story is land, power and capex. This is the other half – which business models become fundable, compliant, scalable workloads, and which die in the lab.
Most of this report reads the supply: land, power, capex, pipelines. The harder question is which AI and digital-asset business models will still be renting megawatts once the law, the fraud risk and the capital markets have filtered the hype. Two CMS lawyers, an enterprise adviser and an operator read that demand, with more contributors joining.
The lens is theirs; the read is the Entelligencia desk’s, graded and sourced like the rest of the report. Two CMS lawyers who sit upstream of the build, where AI and digital-asset business models are financed and regulated long before they become megawatts. An adviser who works downstream of it, inside the enterprises expected to absorb what gets built. And an operator who argues the capacity should go somewhere else entirely.
CKKerrigan structures the financings that turn AI and digital-asset ideas into fundable businesses. His public record spans over $5bn of fintech platform financings, more than 65 NFT projects and 250-plus crypto-asset clients, plus tokenisation across debt, equity and alternatives. He edits the reference works practitioners and regulators reach for, and advises the Bank of England’s Financial Markets Law Committee and UK parliamentary groups on AI and blockchain.
ESStanford works within CMS’s digital-assets and AI team, with a specialism in crypto-industry failures, fraud and risk. Her lens reads which business models are durable demand and which are likely to be regulated away or simply collapse – the filter most capacity forecasts never apply. Where Kerrigan reads what can be financed, she reads what will still be standing once the fraud and the rule-making have done their work.
WMMills advises enterprises on the part of AI adoption that happens after the contract is signed. Her work sits where strategy meets operating model: how authority, workflow and risk ownership have to move before compute can be used at scale. She argues the binding constraint on the build is organisational rather than technical, and reads the split between training and inference as two infrastructure markets rather than one.
PHFour decades in the industry, now arguing the next tranche of capacity does not need new ground. Hannaford’s case is redundant urban buildings and stranded power, with resilience held in the network rather than in any single building.
Kerrigan does the diligence on the deals this layer is about. Asked how many AI and digital-asset models become fundable demand, he put it at 35 out of 100, and then declined to pretend the number was knowable.
He reaches for William Goldman, who in 1983 tried to explain which films would earn back their cost and concluded that nobody knows anything. Kerrigan applies it directly to AI, with one qualification: it would be strange, he says, if we started working with the most transformational technology since electricity and all it ended up doing was helping with emails.
Digital assets he finds easier to call. Regulation in most jurisdictions now pulls crypto inside the perimeter and treats it as investment, with the disclosure and customer-safety obligations that follow. If you wanted institutional adoption, you got it. If you wanted an alternative financial system, you did not.
“Could the business be copied by two kids in a garage with Fable?”
One of three questions he now asks of anything described as AI-powered. The first is whether it really is. The second is whether the AI use is fit for business, which is a mix of legal, engineering and commercial work. The third is that one, and the follow-up that matters more: would the copy lack the proprietary data that makes the original valuable, and would it be enterprise-ready on security and maintenance. There is still a wide gap between vibe-coded work and software you could offer a sophisticated partner.
He was given six factors and one hundred points. This is where a corporate finance lawyer put them, and it is not where the brief expected.
In his own words: “Have I set the sliders in a place you didn’t expect from a lawyer? Teams are the most important thing. Everything else can be fixed.” He rated regulatory clarity at nine deliberately, on the reasoning that once there is a rule saying how you can do something, everyone can do it. A really new business idea has no rules, because we only make rules for things we have already seen. Asked what most often kills fundability early, he was blunt: a founder team that falls out or lacks true alignment.
Wallis Mills works inside the enterprises expected to absorb what gets built, which is where this chapter’s question is finally settled. Her answer is that the demand may not arrive in the form the build assumes, and she is specific about why. Not that nobody wants it. That enterprises cannot reorganise fast enough to use it. Seven files on institutional drag, the training and inference split she calls the Great Decoupling, and the data debt underneath all of it.
Contributed by Wallis Mills, Founder and Principal Advisor, Modern Enterprise, 10 August 2026, named with firm and title at the contributor’s request · passages inside quotation marks are reproduced from her written submission; her other positions are reported in the desk’s house style · supporting evidence, grading and desk reads are Entelligencia’s and were gathered independently · the Great Decoupling is her term for the training and inference split and is used here as hers
Charles Kerrigan reads which business models can be financed. Wallis Mills reads whether the buyer can absorb what it bought. Stanford applies the third screen: how much candidate demand survives the regulation and the failure rate. She is careful about the fraud number, putting criminal use at around one per cent, and hard about what that leaves. Six files, and a closing question no other contributor has asked in quite this way.
Her weighting, out of 100. Governance outranks the licence, which is the item a forecast is most likely to treat as sufficient.
Contributed by Erica Stanford, CMS, 21 July 2026, named with firm and title at the contributor’s request · passages inside quotation marks are reproduced from her written submission; her other positions are reported in the desk’s house style · framing, weighting labels and desk reads are Entelligencia’s
Four decades in the industry, and a view of where the next tranche of capacity physically goes that sits at one end of the scale. Peter Hannaford scores the framing at 0 out of 100 toward compute leaving the planet. His case is that redundant urban buildings and stranded power can carry it instead, and that resilience belongs in the network rather than the building. Eight files.
Contributed by Peter Hannaford, CEO, EdgeNebula, 12 August 2026, named with firm and title at the contributor’s request · passages inside quotation marks are reproduced from his written submission; his other positions are reported in the desk’s house style · supporting evidence is Entelligencia’s, gathered independently and set beside his file rather than substituted for it
AI is now the primary engine of new data-centre capacity; multiple studies put it past half of total IT load by the early 2030s. The money has caught up with the forecast: combined 2026 capital spending by the top five hyperscalers is set to exceed $600bn, most of it directed at AI systems Announced, with 2025 to 2027 tracking toward $1.15tn and financed increasingly through infrastructure vehicles and asset-backed structures Estimated. But a megawatt forecast is a supply abstraction. Behind every persistent workload sits a business model that had to be financed and had to pass a regulator.
AI training and inference want high-density power, new cooling and specialised interconnects; crypto and digital-asset platforms – exchanges, custody, tokenisation, on-chain analytics – add their own steady draw. Both increasingly run in colocation and cloud rather than enterprise server rooms, so a regulatory or business-model shift translates almost directly into a leasing decision and a power-capacity plan. The supply side of this report tracks where the megawatts get built. The demand side asks a harder question: which workloads are real enough to fill them, and for how long. Kerrigan and Stanford sit where that gets decided – not in the data hall, but in the financing and the regulation that let a model or a token become a business in the first place.
It helps to draw the contrast plainly. The two lawyers rarely sit on the same panel, which is exactly why the demand-side view is useful: it reads the build from the other end.
Real-world asset tokenisation has moved from pilots to live institutional deals – tokenised treasuries, funds and private credit – and developers are now reaching for the same machinery, using real-world-asset structures and stablecoin-denominated financing to tap broader capital pools, which is drawing closer regulatory attention Contested. Buyers are also locking supply years ahead, through forward capacity reservations and direct wafer prepayments with memory makers, the mechanism now visible in the memory squeeze Verified. and the structuring work that makes them legally robust is, in practice, what decides which projects get funded and built.
He also edits the reference works practitioners and regulators reach for – Crypto and Digital Assets: Law and Regulation (2023) and a second edition of Artificial Intelligence: Law and Regulation in early 2026. A fundable structure is the difference between a deck and a workload: the tokenised infra or AI project that is legally robust moves from idea to real compute sitting in a data centre; the one that is not, does not.
Financing decides what can be built; regulation decides what is allowed to run, and how fast it can grow. The EU AI Act, IOSCO’s crypto recommendations and Europe’s MiCAR regime are tightening at once, and each rule is a gate: it lets some business models through and closes others.
This is where Stanford’s lens earns its place. Her work on crypto failures, fraud and risk reads which models are durable demand and which are likely to be regulated away or simply collapse – a filter most capacity forecasts never apply. Kerrigan, for his part, advises bodies such as the Bank of England’s Financial Markets Law Committee and UK parliamentary groups on AI and blockchain, which is to say he is close to where the gates are set. Put the two together and you get a rare read on which megawatts are speculative and which are load-bearing.
Stanford’s read is more sceptical than the headline forecasts, but not for the reason most assume. Her lens is which business models are durable demand and which are likely to be regulated away or simply collapse: a filter most capacity forecasts never apply.
Crypto firms must hold audited reserves and obtain full authorisation to operate in the market.
Ends the model where a single firm is exchange, broker, market-maker and counterparty at once.
Asks whether a model’s behaviour can be evidenced when it is used in high-stakes settings.
Three regimes, converging on a single test. Together they close the era of unauditable business models, in crypto and AI alike.
Build megawatts against the shorter clock without screening for compliance and true unit economics, she warns, and you risk raising multi-million-dollar shells for tenants that will not last the life of the asset.
None of this is abstract. Four live archetypes already sit on top of data centres, each a different way the demand-side story shows up in a financing document.
The point is not that lawyers build data centres. It is that the people who structure the financings and navigate the policy help decide which AI and digital-asset business models scale – and therefore how much capacity, and where, the build actually needs.
They sit upstream of data centres, at the point where AI and digital-asset business models either become fundable, compliant, scalable workloads – or die in the lab.
And the capital itself is now fragmenting along geopolitical lines, as United States and China security reviews tighten scrutiny of cross-border ownership of physical compute Estimated. The demand behind the demand is a financing question as much as a compute one. Who can underwrite a gigawatt before it is built, and across which borders, increasingly decides where it lands.
Read that way, this is a demand-side instrument: an early indicator that sits alongside the report’s supply-side spine of land, power, capex and pipelines. Stanford’s direct account of the regulation-and-fraud screen is now part of this read, above. The fuller CMS read – an interview and essay with Kerrigan and Stanford on tokenised infrastructure, AI and digital-asset policy, and the durability of demand – is forthcoming.
The Demand Behind the Demand is a Strata layer inside The Next Hotspot, an interactive read on where the world actually builds AI infrastructure. The full edition is live, and the remaining drops are dated below.
Sources: contributor profiles and public record for Charles Kerrigan and Erica Stanford (CMS; Law Society of Scotland; the Journal of International Banking and Financial Law; reference works, 2023 and 2026); demand projections drawn from McKinsey, ABI Research and Data Center Knowledge; tokenisation and regulation context from the World Economic Forum, IOSCO, the EU AI Act and MiCAR. Archetypes are illustrative demand-side structures, not specific transactions. Direct quotes and a fuller interview with the contributors are forthcoming; the framing here is the Entelligencia desk’s.
Where the build actually happens, and what is in the way.


